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Abstract   
This case study, informed by historical institutionalism, explores how path dependency has been a significant 
factor in the institutionalization of a form of consociational representation in Nova Scotia, accomplished 
through the creation and maintenance of protected ridings for two historical minorities: Acadians and African 
Nova Scotians. The adoption of a ‘consociational districting’ approach by electoral boundary commissions in 
Nova Scotia ran counter to the dominant trend in electoral redistribution and apportionment exercises toward 
reducing the extent of population variance between electoral districts. However, when Canada’s Supreme Court 
created ‘legal space’ for this approach, institutional entrepreneurs in Nova Scotia were able to initiate changes 
that were consistent with provincial history, demography, and political culture, entrenching a consociationalist 
ethic that legitimized the accommodation of cultural group identity. When there was a concerted government 
attempt in 2012 to reject this unorthodox practice, its constitutional validity was upheld by the courts and the 
protected ridings subsequently restored. In effect, history and institutions matter in the politics of redistricting, 
giving Canadian provinces significant leeway in pursuing their own distinctive approach, especially as it 
concerns the representation of minorities. 
 
Résumé   
Inspirée par l'institutionnalisme historique, cette étude de l’établissement et du maintien de deux 
circonscriptions protégées pour deux minorités historiques - les Acadiens et les Néo-Écossais d'origine 
africaine - montre comment la dépendance au sentier a été un facteur significatif dans l'institutionnalisation 
d'une forme de représentation consociative en Nouvelle-Écosse. L'adoption d'une approche de "district 
consociatif" par les commissions de délimitation des circonscriptions électorales dans la province est allée à 
l'encontre de la tendance dominante des exercices de redistribution et de répartition électorales visant à 
réduire les disparités entre le nombre d’électeurs pour chacune des circonscriptions électorales. Toutefois, 
lorsque la Cour suprême du Canada a créé un "espace juridique" pour cette approche de district consociatif, les 
“entrepreneurs institutionnels” en Nouvelle-Écosse ont pu adopter des changements qui étaient en symbiose 
avec l'histoire, la démographie et la culture politique de la province, enchâssant ainsi une éthique consociative 
qui légitimait la prise en compte de l'identité des groupes culturels. Lorsqu'en 2012, le gouvernement a tenté 
de modifier cette pratique inhabituelle, sa validité constitutionnelle a été confirmée par les tribunaux et les 
circonscriptions protégées ont été par la suite restaurées. En fait, l'histoire et les institutions peuvent faire une 
différence dans l’instauration d’une politique de redécoupage électoral, ce qui donne aux provinces 
canadiennes une grande marge de manœuvre dans la poursuite de leur propre approche spécifique, en 
particulier en ce qui a trait à la représentation des minorités. 
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The periodic revision of electoral boundaries by independent electoral boundary 
commissions (EBCs) has been a key component of the federal electoral process in Canada 
since the 1960s, and in every province since the 1990s. As described by John Courtney, 
electoral boundary commissions and the redistricting process has become an ‘institutional 
building block’ vital to the construction and operation of legislatures (2001: 237). But while 
electoral jurisprudence has provided legal guidelines for legislatures and commissions, these 
guidelines have remained ambiguous and open to interpretation, and in a decentralized 
federation such as Canada, this has given provinces leeway to apply these guidelines in a 
fashion unique to their provincial context. In effect, these institutional building blocks have 
been adapted to unique provincial contexts. This has been made possible because Canadian 
courts have opened up legal ‘space’ for the exercise of discretion by legislatures and 
boundary commission mapmakers – where and when they are disposed to do so – that can 
be legitimately occupied to protect or promote the political representation of minority 
communities. Over time and with repeated redistributions, minority electoral districts can 
become a de facto, and to some extent de jure, consociational feature of the political system. 
This is precisely the evolved situation in the province of Nova Scotia. 
Nova Scotia stands apart from other Canadian provinces in both the process and 
outcome of its redistribution exercises, beginning with its first one in 1992. In particular, it 
has been the only province to fully embrace the practice of ‘consociational districting’ as a 
means to ensure the effective political representation of two historical minorities in the 
province: French-speaking Acadians (less than 4% of the provincial population) and African 
Canadians (less than 3%).1 It has done this by protecting four minority seats under the 
‘exceptional circumstances’ dispensation for any riding exceeding the +/-25 per cent outer 
limit on deviation from absolute voter parity, a standard enshrined in federal legislation and 
subsequently adopted by seven of ten provinces, including Nova Scotia. This generous use of 
the exceptional circumstance dispensation runs counter to the trend in redistribution 
exercises elsewhere that reduce the extent of population variance between electoral 
districts. Nor have territorially-concentrated minority groups elsewhere seized on the 
Supreme Court’s 1991 Carter decision as grounds for the construction of special electoral 
districts, as in Nova Scotia (Courtney, 2004: 63). 
This article contributes to the study of electoral districting and minority group 
representation in Canada, Nova Scotia politics, and path dependency theory, through an 
analysis of EBCs in Nova Scotia and relevant electoral boundaries jurisprudence. The concept 
of ‘protected ridings’ for historical minorities in Nova Scotia – more specifically, Acadians 
and African Nova Scotians – was introduced by the first provincial EBC in 1992. This 
approach, referred to here as ‘consociational districting’, ran counter to the trend in electoral 
redistribution and apportionment exercises toward reducing the extent of population 
variance between electoral districts. Though rejected by the provincial government twenty 
years after its introduction, the legality and validity of consociational districting was 
restored following a successful court challenge by the Acadian federation of Nova Scotia 
(FANE). An analysis of this case study informed by the historical variant of the new 
institutionalism explores how path dependency has been a significant factor in the de facto 
constitutionalization of consociational representation for the aforementioned minorities. It 
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shows that history and institutions matter in the politics of redistricting, especially insofar 
as it concerns minority representation. 
Historical institutionalism, path dependency, and consociational districting 
Over the last few decades, the breadth of political science widened when the state was 
“brought back in” (Skocpol, 1985) to help explain and understand political phenomena and 
change. Theorized further and often coined as new institutionalism, this line of political 
analysis highlights that political and social outcomes are shaped by norms and “rules of the 
game,” otherwise known (and embodied in some organizational form) as political 
institutions (Lecours, 2000; Thelen and Steinmo, 1992; see Erk, 2008; Allen, 2009; Mahoney 
and Thelen, 2010). We underscore, however, that new institutionalist literature is rich and 
nuanced; broadly it contains at least three strands and also considers a multi-directional 
causal arrow in explaining political dynamics, with many of its proponents emphasizing that 
institutions both affect and reflect identities and society (Lecours, 2000: 502; March and 
Olsen, 1984). The historical variant of new institutionalism stresses the salience of path 
dependence in institutional development. From this standpoint, institutional rules, practices, 
forms, and policy legacies – once established – shape and structure human behavior, agency, 
and relationship patterns between actors (Lecours, 2000, 2005; Thelen and Steinmo, 1992). 
Institutions and their associated processes become embedded and are resistant to change. 
This explains why earlier choices and decisions – for instance about institutional design and 
policy frameworks – are more important than later ones. Once a jurisdiction has adopted and 
asserted a specific institutional track, reversal costs can be high. Alternative decision points 
will arise, but entrenched institutional arrangements and their associated political dynamics 
will obstruct and make costly (in bureaucratic and political terms) the attempts to reverse 
earlier choices that created established institutional pathways (Lecours, 2005: 9 citing Levi 
in Pierson, 2000: 252; Peters et al., 2005: 1287). This is the essence of the concept of path 
dependence.  
Of course, resistance to change does not mean it never occurs.  Historical institutionalism 
recognizes that change can and does occur often at a time of system ‘crisis’ or exogenous 
shock (Harty, 2005: 60). Episodes of institutional change such as this are characterized 
within historical institutionalism  as a ‘critical juncture’ (Collier and Collier, 1991; Thelen, 
1999; Capoccia and Keleman, 2007), or alternatively as an instance of ‘punctuated 
equilibrium’ (Krasner, 1984; Thelen and Steinmo, 1992; Steinmo, 2008) or a ‘formative 
moment’ (Rothstein, 1992). An occurrence of this sort is due to a confluence of factors in 
time that provide a ‘window of opportunity’ for institutional change. This creates an opening 
for political actors who favour new ideas or approaches and have both the ability and the 
will to initiate it (Steinmo, 2008: 170).2 In other words, at least some key political actors need 
to disagree with prevailing institutional dynamics in order to initiate an episode of 
institutional change.3 These political actors are characterized in some new institutionalism 
literature as “institutional entrepreneurs” (Streeck and Yamamura, 2003: 44) who may be 
successful in redefining norms and rules in settings of “institutional ambiguity” that leave 
institutions open to interpretation and contestation (Campbell, 2010: 105).  
Finally, the stabilizing effect of path dependency, once change has been instituted and 
new institutions and their associated ‘pathways’ are sustained through time, needs to be 




emphasized. We also would reiterate the suggestion from Peters et al. that “change in a 
historical institutionalist perspective requires a careful analysis not only of the ideas that 
drive the change, but also the larger social, economic and political context in which these 
ideas are situated” (2005: 1297). Through this historical institutionalist lens, we suggest that 
the embedding and persistence of a ‘consociational ethic’ in electoral redistricting processes 
in Nova Scotia has been subject to the effects of path dependency within a distinctive 
provincial context, both affecting and reflecting a particular tradition of cultural values, 
political practices, and societal identities.           
Consociational districting and the courts 
In a 2018 article in the Canadian Journal of Political Science, Aaron John Spitzer argues that 
the courts have granted francophone minority communities in Canada a “sort of” 
consociational form of protection in the districting process (462). He bases his argument on 
the wording and outcome of several court decisions, beginning with the Supreme Court’s 
Carter decision (1991) and most recently the Nova Scotia Court of Appeals decision in 
Reference re the Final Report of the Electoral Boundaries Commission (2017). In Spitzer’s 
view, the principles by which representation is apportioned in Canada is complicated in the 
first instance by federalism, “where representation attaches not only to individuals but also 
to territorial polities”, but also by the country’s multinational character, “where rights-
bearing polities are not (or not solely) territorially defined, but are discrete ethnic, cultural, 
linguistic or religious peoples” (2018: 448). Whereas the former can lead to non-
equipopulous apportionment between territorial units within a federation, the latter can 
find expression through polity-based representation in a consociational dimension. This 
enhances the legitimacy of democratic institutions by accommodating national groups who 
have grounds to assert a moral and legal claim to various forms of ethno-national power-
sharing arrangements. 
Overweighting of francophones in Canadian political institutions is an established 
practice and tradition in Canada, along with legislative and constitutional guarantees for 
official language minority communities. In fact, Canada has a long history of what David 
Thomas calls “constitutional abeyances” and the toleration of ambiguity about such central 
constitutional questions as the status and recognition of Quebec as something other than a 
province (Thomas, 1997). For instance, Quebec has its own representation within the 
Francophonie and, since 2006, a seat beside Canada at UNESCO. Nor are asymmetrical or 
consociational-type arrangements restricted to Quebec’s place within Canada. Provinces 
have granted various forms of autonomy for minority communities in social and cultural 
policy fields. In Ontario, Catholics have a separate, publicly-funded school system, which the 
courts have upheld as a legitimate expression of the ‘historic settlement’ between religious 
groups as enshrined in sec. 93 of the Constitution Act 1867 (Dickinson and Dolmage, 1996). 
In Nova Scotia, there are autonomous Education Authorities for Acadians and for the 
Mi’kmaq people.4  
While arrangements such as these may be an affront to classical liberalism which 
privileges formal individual equality, or symmetrical forms of territorial federalism (where 
each provincial or state unit has the same status and powers), Spitzer argues that 
Francophone Minority Community (FMC) claimants, like Acadians, “might be owed internal 
self-determination based on constitutional guarantees” (459), including rights of 
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representation. He acknowledges, however, that the courts have not adopted this particular 
line of reasoning in decisions upholding legal challenges to electoral maps that submerge 
francophone minorities, as in New Brunswick and Nova Scotia (450-51). Rather, they have 
sidestepped ruling on such consociational representation claims, relying instead on ‘effective 
representation’ and ‘community of interest’ concerns to provide legal space for exemptions 
from the egalitarian principle of voter parity. Spitzer argues this judicial reasoning conflates 
constitutionally distinct, first-order polity-based rights with second-order egalitarian 
concerns, a lack of jurisprudential clarity “that may ultimately erode the legitimacy of 
governance in multinational states like Canada” (464). 
Spitzer worries that a potentially significant feature of multinational governance in 
Canada – consociational apportionment – has been set aside in electoral jurisprudence in 
favour of something of less political and constitutional significance: affirmative 
gerrymandering. Indeed, these worries may be justified, as we will see, by the recent history 
of protected minority ridings in Nova Scotia. On the other hand, the ultimate resolution of 
the status of these ridings may suggest otherwise. While many consociational practices in 
Canada do not take the form of explicit constitutional rights, they can and have been ‘legally 
enabled’ by the courts. Where such practices assume the status of political conventions 
embedded within the political culture and traditions of a jurisdiction, and buttressed by 
institutions that exert their own path dependency effects, the line between ‘affirmative 
gerrymandering’ and ‘consociational apportionment’ can become blurred to practical 
insignificance.  This preference for evolved practice over entrenched constitutionality is 
itself a time-honoured tradition within Canadian federalism (Albert, 2016). 
Electoral districting in Nova Scotia: a history 
For most of its history, Nova Scotia’s electoral districts were primarily influenced by 
municipal and county boundaries and the importance of religious divisions, along with the 
usual periodic partisan re-jigging by the legislature. These arrangements persisted for 150 
years, from the 1830s to the 1980s. Malapportionment – inequality in the number of voters 
between electoral districts – does not appear to have been a major concern, as illustrated by 
the fact that, prior to the report of the province’s first independent electoral boundaries 
commission in 1992, Nova Scotia had the distinction of having the most malapportioned 
electoral districts in Canada (Courtney, 2001: 240). 
 For much of the province’s history, concern about religious balance in the legislature 
took the form of dual member ridings, which were common throughout Nova Scotia from the 
pre-Confederation period until the mid-20th century. Two electoral districts – Inverness and 
Yarmouth –were dual member ridings as late as 1981 (ENS, “Past Election Results”). 
Acadians were able to gain political representation and influence through this mechanism. 
Thus, the defection of the government’s Acadian members from Yarmouth on a question of 
Catholic rights led to its defeat in the election of 1855, while in 1859, “the Acadian vote 
enabled the Conservatives to win all six seats in Yarmouth and Digby counties” (Beck 1985, 
149). Between 1867 and 1937, in the dual riding of Digby (which included the Acadian 
district of Clare), one of the two representatives was always from the Acadian community, 
while the sole Member of the House of Assembly (MHA) between 1941 and 1949 was an 
Acadian. In the latter election, Clare made its debut as a separate riding, guaranteeing the 
election of an Acadian representative for the next 65 years running, until its abolition in the 




2012 redistribution. In the adjacent dual riding of Yarmouth (which included the Acadian 
district of Argyle), one of the elected members between 1867 and 1978 was often (though 
not always) an Acadian; the creation of Argyle as a separate electoral district in 1981 led to 
the near-certain election of an Acadian representative thereafter (ENS, “Past Election 
Results”). 
The legal context for the process of electoral redistricting, and in general for ensuring 
fair and democratic elections, changed with the constitutional entrenchment of the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms in 1982. Section 3 of the Charter reads as follows: “Every 
citizen of Canada has the right to vote in an election of the members of the House of Commons 
or of a legislative assembly and to be qualified for membership therein.” In case law since 
the Charter’s inception, the courts have interpreted the full meaning and import of this right 
for Canadian citizens by ruling on such issues as acceptable restrictions on the right to vote 
(for example, age of eligibility). However, the most pertinent ruling for the boundary 
adjustment process was the Carter decision, handed down by the Supreme Court in 1991. At 
issue in Carter, or Reference re Provincial Electoral Boundaries (Sask.), was the question of 
variance in the size of voter populations between constituencies, and whether the sec. 3 
Charter right of some citizens had been infringed by proposed changes to Saskatchewan 
electoral boundaries which treated urban, rural and northern ridings differently. In its 
ruling, the Court held that the purpose of the right to vote enshrined in the Charter is not 
equality of voting power per se but the right to "effective representation":   
 The right to vote therefore comprises many factors, of which equity is but one.  The 
section does not guarantee equality of voting power. Relative parity of voting 
power is a prime condition of effective representation.  Deviations from absolute 
voter parity, however, may be justified on the grounds of practical impossibility or 
the provision of more effective representation. Factors like geography, 
community history, community interests and minority representation may 
need to be taken into account to ensure that our legislative assemblies 
effectively represent the diversity of our social mosaic.  Beyond this, dilution 
of one citizen's vote as compared with another's should not be countenanced 
(emphasis added; excerpted from pages 8-17 of the Supreme Court’s Carter 
decision, re Provincial Electoral Boundaries (Sask.), [1991] 2 S.C.R. 158).  
In Carter, while the Supreme Court found that a violation of Section 3 had not been 
established, more important was the meaning given to it: a citizen right not to equal, but to 
effective representation, with due consideration given to several factors, including community 
interests and minority representation. “There’s no doubt that Carter did contribute to a shift in 
the debate over territorially defined representational building blocks, moving it in a direction 
not previously a part of constituency redistributions in Canada” (Courtney, 2001: 203).  
However, as noted by Courtney, “Ambiguities abound in the [Carter] decision. Language and 
terms as imprecise as ‘effective representation’, ‘fair representation conducive to good 
government’ and ‘relative parity of voting power’ are open to varying, possibly even 
contradictory interpretations … Carter offers no firm guidance for reconciling voter equality 
with other principles … such as cultural or group identity” (2001: 198-99). Rather, this difficult 
task was left to legislatures and EBCs. While this ambiguity in institutional purpose was not in 
itself a sufficient condition for institutional change, it did enhance the possibility of change 
initiated by ‘institutional entrepreneurs’. 
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In retrospect, Carter was a game-changer for the electoral boundary adjustment process 
in Canada. In the wake of the decision, Nova Scotia faced the possibility of a judicial ruling 
that would strike down electoral boundaries that did not conform to sec. 3 of the Charter. 
There was concern about excessive deviance in relative voter parity due in part to past 
practices of legislative gerrymandering. Indeed, as previously noted, no other province 
featured a greater degree of malapportionment in its electoral districts (Courtney, 2001: 
240).  
While the Carter decision changed the legal context for the process of reviewing and 
adjusting electoral boundaries, the political context at both the national and provincial level 
helps to explain the form and character of the Nova Scotia response. The national scene was 
engrossed in urgent negotiations and proposals to reform the Canadian constitution in order 
to stave off the surging movement toward secession in Quebec. Prominent on the agenda 
was the status of Quebec in Canada, as well as treaty and aboriginal rights for Indigenous 
Peoples, which prompted  debates across the country about the need to recognize and 
accommodate minorities whose history and identity generated claims to ‘distinct society’ or 
‘nation’ status within Canada (see for example, McRoberts and Monahan, 1993; Cook, 1994).5 
At the provincial level, popular sentiment in the early 1990s had shifted strongly toward 
the need to reform governance practices. The Premier during this period (1991-93) was 
Donald Cameron, who assumed the premiership pledging to move the province away from 
the old style, traditional politics that had characterized his predecessor’s time in office. John 
Buchanan’s 12 years as premier had been rife with patronage, corruption, personal 
favouritism, elite accommodation and fiscal profligacy. The scandals that roiled the 
province’s politics included revelations of the 1988 Inquiry into the wrongful conviction and 
11-year incarceration of Donald Marshall, a young Mi’kmaq from Membertou First Nation, 
which exposed systemic racism within the police and judiciary, and dramatic testimony by 
senior civil servants about blatant patronage practices. Then in the summer of 1991, a race 
riot in Halifax prompted a round of discussions between community leaders and elected 
officials on how to address the grievances of the province’s Black community.6 Cameron 
quickly set about acting on his promise to reform and modernize governance practices 
(Clancy et al., 2000: 24, 33). Given this context, it should not be surprising that Cameron’s 
reformist agenda should include an overhaul of the electoral process, including the manner 
in which constituency boundaries were determined; not surprising either that Acadian, 
Mi’kmaq, and African Nova Scotians were singled out as groups deserving of special 
consideration by the province’s first electoral boundaries commission (Courtney, 2001: 
190). Cameron was seeking “to establish his bona fides as a reformer and a progressive by 
applying Carter’s principles to his province’s unique social setting” (Courtney, 2001: 202). 
It was this confluence of factors that shaped the historical moment or critical conjuncture 
that produced an all-party agreement in the legislature to establish Nova Scotia’s first 
independent Electoral Boundaries Commission. It comprised a membership that was larger 
and more demographically varied “than usual for Canada, including Acadian and Black 
representatives to ensure minority representation would be a primary focus of its 
deliberations” (Courtney, 2001: 102-03). Courtney argues that no province was impacted by 
the Carter decision as much as Nova Scotia; it provided both the language for the 
establishment of an all-party Select Committee, as well as the Terms of Reference for the 
Commission (2001: 174, 185). “The balanced composition of the commission, the absence of 
a legislated range of average constituency population, and the acceptance of the proposition 




that protected constituencies should be constructed, all combined to ensure that the 
redistribution undertaken in Nova Scotia in the 1990s was unlike any other in Canadian 
history” (Courtney 2001, 104). 7  
The Terms of Reference for the commission dictated a 52-seat legislature with an 
additional member to represent the Mi’kmaq people of the province. The latter was to be a 
designated seat, set aside exclusively for the Mi’kmaq in a manner to be determined after “a 
broad and thorough consultation with all native groups” (EBC, 1992: 13). There were no 
designated seats for Acadians or African Nova Scotians; rather, electoral districts were to be 
maintained or created that might differ substantially from the concept of relative parity of 
voter power, “in order to encourage but not guarantee minority group representatives in the 
House of Assembly” (EBC, 1992: 28). Accordingly, the electoral map drawn by the 
commission included four protected ridings designed to encourage the election of three 
Acadians and an African Nova Scotian.  Three of these were already existing districts where 
Acadians were in the majority or constituted a relatively high proportion of the population 
(Clare, Argyle and Richmond). The fourth district was the new constituency of Preston, 
where there was a concentration of Black voters (though not a majority). All four were 
smaller-than-average districts – between .50 and .65 the average district population of 
17,500 – and were “justified in terms that the commission was certain would meet Carter’s 
goal of ensuring that a legislature ‘represent the diversity of the social mosaic’” (Courtney, 
2001: 191; EBC, 1992: 35).8 
Though the House of Assembly Act was amended by the insertion of section 6(1) that 
provides for a designated Mi’kmaq seat in the legislature, the result of the consultations 
undertaken was “a widespread sentiment that more time was needed to discuss and resolve 
issues and achieve consensus” (EBC, 1992: 146). Among the reasons given by Mi’kmaq 
community leaders was the idea that the Mi’kmaq should not be involved with or in any way 
implicated in the government of the province since it might compromise their sovereignty 
and the primacy of their relationship with the federal government. Others placed the quest 
for Mi’kmaq self-determination and recognition of the treaties as their first priority (EBC, 
1992: 136-7). The Commission Report simply noted that, “At the request of the Mi’kmaq 
community, no recommendation as to how a native seat should be constituted is being made 
at this time” (EBC, 1992: 33). 
With a designated Mi’kmaq seat off the table, it was Acadians and African Nova Scotians 
who received special consideration in the 1992 redistribution.  Both communities regarded 
themselves (along with the Anglo-Celtic majority and the Mi’kmaq people) as one of the “four 
charter peoples” of the province (Courtney, 1991: 225), historic minorities that were 
distinctive to the province, with fairly well-defined territorial ‘homelands’ that had been 
continuously occupied for hundreds of years. Their sense of identity was a function of their 
long evolution as ethno-linguistic or racial minorities within an Anglo-Celtic majority, but 
also, just as importantly, arose from their distinctive cultures nurtured over centuries of 
relative isolation as coherent communities (due to remote rural locale and social exclusion). 
In short, they constituted historical minorities that were distinctively Nova Scotian and 
deeply rooted in specific territorial ‘homelands’.   
While descendants of the early residents of these minority communities had dispersed 
throughout the province, this did not diminish the importance of constituency 
representatives from the protected ridings. Rather, the demographic reality gave them a dual 
role both within and outside the legislature: they represented a particular geographic 
40     Canadian Political Science Review  
 
constituency, but also acted as representatives for the whole of the extended cultural 
community they represented. Acadians across the province depended on them to do what 
they could to preserve the distinctive Acadian language, culture and tradition. Similarly, a 
strong African Nova Scotian voter presence within the boundaries of the protected 
constituency of Preston gave its elected representative a special role to play on behalf of that 
cultural community.9 They provided what Melissa Williams has called “voice” and “trust” in 
the representational process for marginalized groups, “especially those who can draw on a 
long memory of systemic discrimination” (Williams, 1998 as cited in Courtney, 2001: 121). 
A decade after the path-breaking 1992 redistribution, the Terms of Reference for the 
province’s second EBC differed in two key respects. While a 52-seat legislature was once 
again mandated, there was no mention of an additional designated seat for a Mi’kmaq 
representative, as there had been in 1992. Secondly, a maximum variance of 25 per cent (+/-
) from the average number of electors per constituency was set, except for extraordinary 
circumstances, including the desire to promote minority representation of the Acadian and 
African Nova Scotian communities. Once again, the Commission protected – due to their 
‘exceptional circumstances’ – the same four small ridings which fell between .50 and .60 of 
the average constituency size of 17,462 (containing on average 13,328 electors). Notably, the 
Final Report of the 2002 commission also contained an expression of doubt about continuing 
in the future with the ‘protected ridings’ approach, “based on considerable public comment” 
it had received. In this connection, it recommended that the next Commission re-evaluate 
the method and means of encouraging effective representation for specified minority 
communities (Dodds, 2002: 36-37).10 
The contested 2012 redistribution 
The 2012 Electoral Boundaries Commission found itself embroiled in political controversy 
when its Interim Report to the government was invalidated (declared null and void) by the 
Attorney General in the Dexter NDP government. The Terms of Reference for the commission 
differed in three key aspects from previous commissions. They stipulated an assembly of 
“not more than” 52 seats, signaling to the Commission that it could consider a smaller 
number of ridings. They also released the Commission of any constraint on a new electoral 
map imposed by the long tradition of observing the integrity of county or municipal 
boundaries. Most significant was the inclusion of section 2d, stipulating that there should be 
no exceptions to the maximum permitted variance in constituency population of +/-25 per 
cent. This triggered the dissent of the Select Committee’s opposition members, since it would 
effectively exclude the possibility of maintaining the four protected ridings (MacNeil, 2012a). 
Taken together, these changes seem to suggest that the government was clearing away 
obstacles – such as observance of traditional boundaries and protecting small minority 
districts – that might prevent the Electoral Boundaries Commission from recommending a 
smaller legislature (though there was no explicit statement of this intent). 
In its deliberations, the 2012 EBC recognized that there are a number of legal, 
constitutional, and political factors relevant to the question of protected constituencies. 
French is one of Canada’s official languages, given effect by the Official Languages Act (1969), 
amongst other laws and programs. Further, constitutional protection for minority language 
rights is entrenched in Sections 16-23 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Provincially, 
the French Language Services Act and the creation of the Acadian school board are measures 




taken to preserve and promote the linguistic rights of French-speaking Nova Scotians. The 
protection offered to the three Acadian constituencies was an additional measure taken to 
recognize and protect the Acadian communities from whence the vast majority of Nova 
Scotia’s French-speaking population derives. As well, representatives of the Acadian 
community argued that more than two decades of special protection had established a 
political convention and moral covenant between the province and the minority populations 
in the affected constituencies.11 
After hearing extensive testimony and strong demonstrations of public support in the 
affected Acadian ridings during the public hearings process, the Commission recommended 
that there continue to be an exemption for the four protected ridings from the maximum 
variance rule provided to the Commission in its Terms of Reference. Its Interim Report 
recommended that the electoral boundaries of these districts remain unaltered, basing its 
decision on the constitutional right of the minorities in question to effective representation 
in the legislature. The recommendation was not unanimous; one Commission member so 
strongly disagreed that she resigned in protest.12 
Confronted with the Commission’s non-compliance with the Terms of Reference that the 
government insisted were legally binding, the EBC was directed by the provincial Attorney 
General to prepare a new report, one that eliminated the four special ridings (MacNeil, 
2012b: 66). Premier Darryl Dexter also lashed out at the Commission for not complying with 
its Terms of Reference (Tutton and Doucette 2012). After discussion of its options, the 
Commission reluctantly agreed to revise its report, such that all ridings were fully compliant 
with the Terms of Reference. This change effectively abolished the protected ridings. The 
Commission’s Acadian member, reflecting the negative public reaction in the affected 
minority communities, dissented from the Final Report, stating his conscientious objection 
to the elimination of the protected ridings.13 
With the removal of protection for the Acadian ridings, their ‘host regions’ would lose 
three electoral districts while Halifax would gain two. This reduced the size of the legislature 
to 51 seats, with an average district size of 13,952 electors (slightly higher than 2002). Other 
recommendations included consultation with minority communities on alternative forms of 
representation and the need for study of electoral system reform. A final recommendation 
was that there should be a draft of proposed changes to electoral boundaries before the first 
round of public hearings, as a means of stimulating low levels of public response and 
participation in the process (MacNeil, 2012c). 
Reference re the Final Report of the Electoral Boundaries Commission 
In 2014, the Fédération acadienne de la Nouvelle Écosse (FANE), the organization 
representing the province’s Acadian population, began legal action to have the 2012 
redistribution exercise overturned. Within months, the province’s new Liberal government 
under Premier Stephen MacNeil, following negotiations with FANE, referred the case to the 
Nova Scotia Court of Appeal (NSCA), asking for its opinion on legality of the 2012 electoral 
boundaries. The case, heard by the court in September 2016, was unprecedented. The 
province submitted a two-step question to the Court. Did the actions of the Nova Scotia 
government toward the 2012 Electoral Boundaries Commission violate Section 3 of the 
Charter of Rights (the right to effective representation)? If the Court answered ‘yes’ to this 
question, was the ‘impugned legislation’ that implemented the new electoral boundaries 
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‘saved’ by Section 1 of the Charter (the limits clause)? In its response, the Court answered 
YES to first question and NO to the second. In effect, the Court of Appeal had placed in 
question the legality of provincial elections conducted on the basis of what now appeared to 
be legally invalidated electoral boundaries (Nova Scotia Court of Appeal, 2017).   
In handing down its opinion, the NSCA argued that the Attorney General’s intervention 
had thwarted the 2012 Electoral Boundaries Commission in the performance of its 
constitutional mandate as required by sec. 3 of the Charter, resulting in a Final Report that 
was not the authentic view of the Commission. In effect, the Court ruled that the government 
must allow an Independent Commission to carry out its work in an unimpeded fashion, to 
submit its recommendations in a Final Report, and to have the latter introduced unaltered 
into the House of Assembly in the form of a bill. The opinion raised two serious issues. First, 
the Court objected to the manner in which the government intervened in the workings of the 
Commission: the boundary review process. Simply put, the Attorney General had undercut 
the independence of the Commission, thereby contravening Section 5 of the House of 
Assembly Act (the legislation establishing Electoral Boundaries Commissions and the 
boundary review process). Secondly, by preventing the Commission from conveying its 
“authentic view” of an electoral boundary map that would best achieve the balance between 
voter parity and other considerations, the Commission was blocked from fulfilling its 
constitutional requirement under sec. 3 of the Charter. In effect, the right of the minorities in 
question to effective representation had been unjustifiably limited or denied.14 Clearly, the 
Court was registering its misgivings about both the process and the substantive outcome of 
the boundary review, which was the reduction of the minority community’s political 
influence to the point of ineffectiveness.  
The Keefe Commission 
In response to this NSCA opinion, the Nova Scotia government appointed the Commission on 
Effective Electoral Representation of Acadian and African Nova Scotians, chaired by former 
Deputy Minister of Justice Doug Keefe, to provide recommendations on how best to achieve 
effective representation for Acadian and African Nova Scotians in a manner consistent with 
the principles enunciated in the Carter decision. It was directed to seek the advice and 
support of these minority communities on this issue, and to consider various options 
including the concept of designated (as opposed to protected) seats for these communities 
similar to the provision for a Mi’kmaq seat in the legislature (as previously discussed).  
The Keefe Commission first dismissed serious consideration of electoral system reform 
as a solution. While Keefe recognized “the tendency of our electoral system to submerge 
minority voters,” he concluded that adoption of some version of proportional representation 
with a minimum threshold requirement would not guarantee the effective representation of 
Acadians and African Nova Scotians, unless this also included some form of quota, reserved 
or designated seats for these communities. Indeed, it was the idea of designated seats that 
generated the most intense Commission discussion and analysis. Its ultimate decision not to 
recommend designated seats, a decision based on conceptual and practical grounds, was, by 
its own admission, its most difficult one (Keefe, 2018: 5).  
With designated seats eliminated as an option, two general strategies shaped the 
Commission’s approach: 1) improve the chances of electing Acadians and African Nova 
Scotians under the simple plurality, single member district electoral system and 2) 




strengthen other means of representing these minorities through reforms to government 
organization and practices. The first strategy yielded a number of key recommendations. 
First, EBCs should be permitted to create additional ridings (beyond the 51-seat status quo) 
to increase flexibility in crafting boundaries that meet the principle of effective 
representation. Second, the standard variance limit from voter parity of 25 per cent (+/-) 
should be maintained. Third, there should be discretion to recommend “exceptional ridings” 
that exceeded this variance limit. Fourth, the possibility of non-contiguous ridings, that 
connect small minority communities, should be admitted. Finally, the Keefe Commission 
suggested there may be an opportunity to improve representation for Acadians and African 
Nova Scotians beyond the four protected ridings (2018: 8-9). 
The Keefe Report also reflected on the more general problem of rural representation. In 
a section of its report entitled “The Gathering Storm”, Keefe noted that the steadily growing 
population gap between urban and rural areas of the province was likely to produce ever-
larger and more unwieldy rural constituencies (2018: 79). To highlight the representational 
implications of maintaining the status quo in terms of the size of the legislature, the 
Commission recommended that the next EBC prepare two electoral maps: one that reflected 
the status quo and a second map with a higher number of total constituencies. This would 
provide the basis for a broader discussion about what size legislature was required to meet 
the principle of effective representation in rural areas of the province. As the Keefe Report 
plainly stated: “The more ridings there are, the more flexibility commissions will have to 
craft boundaries in accordance with the principles of effective representation” (2018: 7). 
Producing electoral maps for each option would clarify the representational consequences 
of each, while moving the debate away from simplistic tropes about smaller government and 
“saying no to more politicians”.15 
The 2018-19 Electoral Boundary Commission 
Acknowledging that it would accept and follow the NSCA judgement and the 
recommendations of the Keefe Report, in January 2018, the McNeil government assured 
publicly that it would introduce new legislation aimed at achieving effective representation 
for Acadians and African Nova Scotians. FANE also weighed in publicly, registering its 
approval of the Keefe recommendations and expressing the hope that protected ridings 
would be re-established. FANE added that it would push “for a new, exceptional riding in the 
Chéticamp area of Cape Breton, which has a large Acadian population” (MacDonald, 2018). 
The province quickly enacted legislation (Bill 99) which provided amendments to the House 
of Assembly Act, establishing a special boundaries commission to recommend changes 
congruent with the principles enunciated in the Supreme Court’s Carter decision and with 
the opinion of the NSCA in Reference re the Final Report of the Electoral Boundaries 
Commission.  
The select committee’s composition signalled the government’s desire to address the 
fallout from 2012. The committee included a long-serving Acadian member of the legislature 
from the recrafted protected riding of Argyle,16 the non-Acadian MHA for the riding of Clare-
Digby (which contained the Acadian district of Clare), and an African Nova Scotian member 
of the assembly. In terms of regional representation, the rest of the committee membership 
tilted towards Halifax, although the committee Chair represented a riding in the Cape Breton 
region (NS Legislature Bill 99, 2018).  
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The amended House of Assembly Act stipulated that EBCs are to be “broadly 
representative” of the province’s population and include at least one Acadian and African 
Nova Scotian (Dodds, 2018: 82). Most significant about the regionally diverse, nine-member 
EBC was that minority representation was the most extensive to date (NS Legislature Select 
Committee Report, 2018).17 The eight commissioners (in addition to Dr. Colin Dodds, who 
served as Chair) included two African Nova Scotian women (with strong community ties to 
Preston) and two Acadians, one of whom was Paul Gaudet, the lone dissenter from the 2012 
Commission. The second Acadian commissioner was from Chéticamp, a geographically 
isolated community located in northern Cape Breton.18 Addressing effective representation 
for this community would become a major bone of contention among Commission members, 
leading four of nine to register their dissent in the final report when Chéticamp was denied 
the exceptional status enjoyed by the province’s other Acadian communities.19 
The Terms of Reference closely reflected the recommendations in the Keefe Report. They 
maintained the 25 per cent limit for allowable variance from voter parity, but restored 
discretion to the Commission to create exceptional electoral districts that exceeded this limit. 
As well, for the first time, the Terms of Reference explicitly allowed for the creation of non-
contiguous constituencies. Finally, a preliminary report had to be submitted to the 
government with electoral boundaries for 51 ridings (the status quo), and at least one other 
number of electoral districts. After a second round of hearings, a final report was to 
recommend only one option in terms of total number of ridings (Dodds, 2018: 5; Select 
Committee Report, 2018).  
At the Commission’s first meeting, a background report on the history of Electoral 
Boundary Commissions in the province was presented by 2012 EBC commissioner Dr. James 
Bickerton.20 It concluded that there was “no reasonable option but to prepare boundary 
changes that, at minimum, restored some version of the four protected constituencies” 
(Bickerton, 2018: 12; Dodds, 2018: 12), and the report outlined the various options for doing 
this. The various approaches considered by the EBC included continuing the protected 
ridings concept (referred to as “exceptional” electoral districts), variations on the concept of 
‘at large’ administrative districts for Acadians and African Nova Scotians, and utilizing the 
idea of non-contiguous ridings (Dodds, 2018: 13-27; 2019: 87-96). The Bickerton Report 
also floated the alternative of a return to the dual member tradition for the Inverness 
constituency, “with the stipulation that one of the two elected representatives be a French-
speaking Acadian” as a way to improve representation for Chéticamp area Acadians (2018: 
12-13).21  
In its Interim Report, the EBC produced a number of boundary scenarios reflecting these 
options, along with a 51-seat status quo option that mirrored the controverted 2012 
electoral map. The report noted that any support for non-contiguous ridings, both among the 
commissioners and the public, was lukewarm at best. While both sets of public hearings saw 
some concerns raised regarding “special” treatment for minorities, along with the usual 
(though not many) calls for fewer MLAs and “smaller government”, strong public support 
was again demonstrated for the restoration of affected exceptional districts (see Dodds 
2019: 70-81).   
The EBC presented its final report in April 2019 recommending an electoral map 
containing 55 districts, representing an average district size of 13,312 electors (Dodds 2019, 
30). This included restoring the three previously protected Acadian districts (which ranged 
from .48 to .56 average district size) and the riding of Preston, which was redrawn to “include 




as many African Nova Scotians living in the area as possible” (Dodds, 2019: 32). While this 
newly configured Preston riding did not exceed the 25 per cent variance limit, therefore 
technically eliminating its “exceptional” status, the Commission reiterated its symbolic, 
cultural, and historical importance, recommending retention of its exceptional status in 
future redistributions (Dodds, 2019: 67, 90). In response to public input and Commission 
deliberations about the increasingly unwieldy size and non-traditional boundaries imposed 
on some rural constituencies, the EBC also recommended three additional ‘exceptional’ 
ridings based on geographic considerations and a definition of community of interest 
associated with traditional political boundaries (Dodds, 2019: 31-33). 22  
While the Commission’s return to the status quo ante in terms of protected ridings was 
met with the approval of 60% of Nova Scotians (Peddle 2019), its deliberations were not 
without internal tension and conflict, as mentioned above, over designating Chéticamp as a 
fourth Acadian district (Dodds, 2019: 2). It ultimately was decided (by a narrow 5-4 margin) 
to reject this option, with the four dissenting commissioners opining that the EBC “did not 
get it right” (Dodds, 2019: 46).23 Despite this protestation, the majority of the Commission 
felt that creating a riding containing less than three thousand voters (compared to a riding 
average of thirteen thousand) was “going too far” in terms of deviation from voter parity 
(Canadian Press Staff, 2019).The final outcome speaks to the balance that EBCs must strike 
between communities of interest, effective representation of minorities, and voter parity 
(Dodds, 2019: 16).24  In pointing toward electoral system reform, the 2018-19 EBC (like the 
preceding Commission) recognized that consociational districting within a single member 
simple plurality system is a potentially fragile electoral compromise for securing the 
effective representation of minorities. As time goes on, will a consociational ethic supporting 
accommodative institutional measures continue to be enough to sustain protected ridings? 
It appears that the 2018-19 EBC was able to design a workable compromise by choosing to 
expand the legislature, thus allowing the growing urban area of the province to gain seats, 
even with the restoration of four protected ridings. 
Conclusion: history and institutions matter 
On the face of it, two small minorities (each under 4% of total provincial population) 
should not garner the degree of special political consideration that has been the case for 
Nova Scotia’s Acadian and African Nova Scotian communities. We suggest the explanation 
lies largely in provincial history (especially its evolved demography), provincial political 
culture, and the structuring ‘path dependency’ effects of legal and political institutions. 
Together these have embedded a particular set of values that embody a bias toward what 
Ken Carty has called a ‘full range’ approach to redistribution, one that is able to accommodate 
cultural group identity in the redistricting process (1992: 153). While on its own this does 
not itself connote a consociational form of democracy in the formal-legal sense, it does imply 
a consociationalist ethic at work in the redistricting process.  
This approach has deep roots in provincial history. The first Acadians representing 
smaller-than-average provincial districts entered the Nova Scotia legislature in the pre-
Confederation period. But it was the political context for the creation of the province’s first 
independent boundaries commission, during a critical conjuncture, that is most pertinent to 
present-day outcomes. With constitutional negotiations at the national level reaching an 
apex in 1991-92, and a new premier in Nova Scotia determined to modernize political 
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institutions and governance practices badly in need of reform, a window of opportunity was 
opened for a gesture toward historic minority communities that could reasonably claim 
status as ‘charter groups’ in the province’s social mosaic. This opportunity only arose, 
however, because of a Supreme Court ruling that tapped into Canada’s pluralistic political 
culture and anti-majoritarian electoral tradition in order to reject, “formal and individualistic 
equality in favour of a more sociological and group-based approach which legitimized 
preferential treatment of the disadvantaged in the interests of equality” (Roach, 1992: 204).  
In this connection, Kent Roach proved prescient when he mused that while the Courts, 
“may be unwilling to create boundaries to facilitate minority representation themselves, 
they may find a way to remand the issue back to boundary commissions and legislatures 
with some guidance as to how they could comply” (1992: 211). Given the constraining 
features of the single member, simple plurality electoral system, this would only be effective 
under specific circumstances. It could “only protect minorities that are politically and 
geographically cohesive and large enough to influence election results. This will be easier to 
achieve in less-populous provinces with smaller constituency sizes” (Roach, 1992: 213). 
Nova Scotia’s four protected districts met these conditions; they represented a near-perfect 
overlap of the place-based ‘community of interest’ and the sociological imperative of 
‘effective representation’ of a minority cultural group that, for historical reasons, was 
deemed to have particular significance for the province’s social mosaic. 
This Nova Scotia version of ‘consociational districting’ was both ‘green-lighted’ and 
sustained by legal and political institutions. We can trace this development to the 
coincidence of a conducive legal framework and a reform-oriented political regime that set 
about creating an electoral boundary commission with an unusually diverse composition 
and a mandate to make an exceptional accommodation for two historic minority 
communities. Electoral jurisprudence that encouraged departures from definitions of 
political equality that gave preference to voter parity over other considerations proved 
essential for the establishment – and later the revival (after a period of banishment) – of 
consociational districting. It seems likely that the electoral boundaries themselves, as 
institutional building blocks, reinforced a shared sense of community interest and identity, 
especially as they overlapped other political or administrative boundaries, and because they 
had remained in place for an extended period. Electoral boundary commissions, district-
linked political associations, and various civil society organizations (media, religious, 
linguistic, heritage, and so forth) combined to provide a supportive and legitimizing 
institutional setting. This institutional matrix, in place over multiple rounds of redistricting, 
contributed to a path dependency effect that revealed itself in the social, legal and political 
response to the abolition of protected ridings in 2012 through the enforcement of legal 
guidelines banning the degree of malapportionment in electoral boundaries that 
consociational districting required. 
While the Nova Scotia experience illustrates the possibility of consociational districting 
within the legal framework provided by electoral jurisprudence in Canada, it also suggests 
its inherent political limits. Most importantly, the institutional, social, and political setting 
must be conducive to this innovative approach. The 2018-19 EBC recommended restoration 
of the four protected ridings for Acadians and African Nova Scotians. However, this was as 
far as the Commission was willing to go; it did not improve upon the effective representation 
of historic minorities, as counselled by the Keefe Commission. In the final analysis, it was 
unwilling to depart from traditional districting principles such as single-member ridings that 




were geographically contiguous and compact, rejecting both a non-contiguous Acadian 
district as well as a new, much smaller minority district designed to capture a geographically 
and culturally isolated community. This suggests limits to how far consociational districting 
can go before voter parity concerns become an overriding consideration. As for the idea of a 
number of designated ‘at large’ minority seats, this was deemed both inappropriate and 
unworkable (a conclusion also reached by the Keefe Commission), due mainly to negative 
public response and concerns about the complicating and controversial representational 
issues that inevitably would arise.  
In all likelihood, another redistribution will take place shortly after the next Nova Scotia 
election, based on the results of the 2021 census. Path dependency will be a major factor in 
determining the Terms of Reference for the next EBC, the composition of the commission, 
and the prospect of maintaining protection for Nova Scotia’s four minority ridings. Beyond 
exceptions for geographically expansive northern ridings with significant Indigenous 
populations, other provinces have shown little inclination to experiment with Nova Scotia’s 
form of consociational districting. Despite favourable electoral jurisprudence supportive of 
innovation in redistricting to enhance minority representation, the absence of ‘late adopters’ 
after almost 30 years suggests this pathbreaking approach to drawing electoral boundaries 





1 According to 2016 census figures, Nova Scotia residents with French as their mother tongue make up 3.2% of 
the population. Black Nova Scotians constitute 2.4% of the total population.  
 
2 The historical institutionalist approach highlights the role of ideas as they may be utilized by powerful political 
actors to effect change (Harty 2005; Steinmo 2008, 170; Hall 1989; Hall and Taylor 1996, 938). Within the new 
institutional framework, ideas are depicted ‘in terms of norms and values whose importance are a function of 
the material institutions from which they emanate’ (Lecours 2005: 7) and would therefore seem crucial in 
explaining institutional formation, affectation, and change (Harty 2005). It should be noted that in combining 
ideas with agency and structure at critical junctures or ‘formative moments’ to explain institutional change, 
historical institutionalism is susceptible to criticism. For instance, it may not account for, or is dismissive of, 
the possibility of different types of incremental change  Mahoney and Thelen 2010; Van der Heijden 2013; Van 
der Heijden and Kuhlmann 2016).  
3 Conflict between political actors over institutional rules, design, or processes does not only occur during 
formative moments; it also “occurs during path-dependent periods,” when “path dependency is sustained by a 
dominant political coalition successfully fending off all attempts by minorities to alter the political course” 
(Peters et al. 2005: 1278).  
4 The Acadian School Board (csap.ca) and, since 2014, the Mi’kmaw Kinamatnewey (kinu.ca).  
 
5 Official bilingualism and minority language education rights had already acknowledged the co-equal status of 
French-speaking Canadians, while treaty and aboriginal rights were entrenched in section 35 of the 
Constitution. The various proposals culminating in the 1992 Charlottetown Accord would have gone much 
further in terms of constitutional recognition and accommodation of Quebec and Aboriginal difference. 
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6 Cameron would refuse to sign the nomination papers of a white contestant for his party’s candidature in the 
newly-created riding of Preston, in order to ensure that they would run a Black candidate instead (Clancy et al., 
2000: 33). 
 
7 The province’s Aboriginal leadership was unwilling to accept the proposed creation of a single designated 
Aboriginal seat at that time (Landes, 1992: 33), nor has it subsequently. 
 
8 While the Commission used the leeway provided by Carter and followed the urging of the Terms of Reference 
to ensure minority representation in the House of Assembly, it otherwise sought to aim for something 
approaching parity (+/- 15%) for other electoral districts, something it achieved for 46 of the 48 remaining 
districts (Smith and Landes, 1998: 20). 
 
9 This speaks to the fact that historic minority cultures indigenous to Nova Scotia – Mi’kmaq, Acadian, or African 
Nova Scotian – depend, for their continued vitality, on the traditional communities that have provided the 
physical, social and cultural context for their formation and development. 
 
10 Otherwise, the adjustments recommended by the 2002 Commission reflected the ongoing shift of population 
away from rural areas of the province toward the main urban region of Halifax.  
11 For the Commission’s detailed arguments on deciding to maintain the protected constituencies, see MacNeil, 
2012a: Appendix G, 59-61. 
 
12 In her letter of resignation, Dr. Jill Grant argued that, “The majority of members of the Commission 
determined that they did not view the Terms of Reference provided by the government as mandatory. I 
disagree with this interpretation and decision. While the Commission has the independence to conduct its work 
at arm’s length from government, the scope of the Commission’s independence is necessarily defined and 
constrained by the TOR which the Legislature provided to guide the process” (MacNeil, 2012a: 62). 
 
13 Mr. Paul Gaudet, stated his disagreement with boundary recommendations that would spell the end of the 
protected Acadian ridings. His dissent recognizes that the task given to the Commission by the conflicting and 
irreconcilable Terms of Reference (2c and 2d) that required the Commission to protect minority representation 
while respecting the Select Committee directive on minimum riding size, was ultimately an impossible one. The 
letter of dissent also contains an eloquent plea for the Acadian people: that their uphill struggle for the survival 
of their culture and identity not be made even more difficult by losing their distinctive voice in the House of 
Assembly. As viewed by Gaudet, the Acadian constituencies – proud geographical and political symbols of 
Acadian historical and cultural presence in Nova Scotia – were nothing less than “vital cornerstones of 
resilience over adversity” (MacNeil, 2012c: 9-13).  
14 “The Attorney General’s intervention prevented the Commission from performing the balancing exercise 
required by s. 3 of the Charter to assess effective representation for the electors in Clare, Argyle and Richmond 
… Consequently, the enactment of those boundaries violated s. 3 of the Charter” (Nova Scotia Court of Appeal, 
2017). https://decisions.courts.ns.ca/nsc/nsca/en/230165/1/document.do (June 11, 2019). 
15 To quote directly from the Commission’s Report: “We recommend the boundaries commission be authorized 
to produce two or more maps, one at the current 51 seats and another at a higher number, to inform a 
discussion about whether 51 seats will adequately provide effective representation for Nova Scotians in the 
future. The more ridings there are, the more flexibility boundaries commissions will have to craft boundaries 
in accordance with the principles of effective representation” (2018: 7). 
16  This MLA, Chris d’Entremont, was on the previous select committee and Hansard records reveal the value 
that the select committee placed on the institutional memory he brought to the table, especially with regard to 
EBC composition and selection (e.g. opinions on number of members and minority representation) (Nova 
Scotia Select Committee Report, 2018). 
17 One MLA from the select committee highlighted the importance of descriptive representation, expressing 
that “just like all of us, for me, having gender and diverse individuals on the commission is of prime importance” 
(Nova Scotia Select Committee Report, 2018). 





18 These appointees included education and labour advocate Carlotta Weymouth as well as lawyer and African 
Nova Scotian community land titling advocate Angela Simmonds. Simmonds was chosen by fellow members to 
be the 2018 EBC Vice Chair. 
19 Also appointed to the 2018 Commission were two other academics with research backgrounds in Nova Scotia 
politics, culture, and political behaviour; a lawyer and former returning officer previously involved with First 
Nations outreach for Elections Nova Scotia; and a senior manager with Nova Scotia Community College actively 
involved with regional and indigenous development.  
20 The introduction of the 2018-19 EBC’s interim report notes that the interim report’s proposals were based 
on the Terms of Reference, input from the public, and the commissioned report prepared by Bickerton. 
21 According to the 2019 Letter of Dissent, two commissioners supported the dual-member constituency option 
as a preferred way to address effective representation for Chéticamp and its environs, before moving back to 
the exceptional district option after it continued to receive strong support during the public hearings.  
22 Specifically, Term of Reference #2 states that “Deviation from electoral parity is justified because of 
geography” while #3 notes that deviation “may be justified because of historical, cultural, or linguistic 
settlement patterns and because of political boundaries. Term of Reference #5 stipulates that “There may be 
one or more exceptional electoral districts where, in exceptional circumstances, the estimated number of 
electors in the electoral district is more than 25 per cent above or below the estimated average number of 
electors per electoral district (Dodds, 2018: 5).  
 
23 The dissenters referenced the Carter judgement in rationalizing and justifying their stance and offered that, 
“as soon as we begin balancing countervailing factors we believe necessary to enhance representation against 
the prime consideration of voter parity, the “primacy of prime” is weakened, if not neutralized” (Dodds 2019: 
49).  
24 In this regard, recommendations in the EBC Final Report included improving Mi’kmaq consultation (both 
prior to and during EBC boundary review process), encouraging political parties to promote minority 
candidacy, asking future EBCs to maintain exceptional status for Preston, and encouraging the government to 
adopt Keefe Report recommendations that would provide further opportunity to enhance effective 
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Lecours, André. 2000. “Theorizing Cultural Identities : Historical Institutionalism as a 
Challenge to Culturalists.” Canadian Journal of Political Science 21(4): 499-522. 
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